Digests · 6 papers
Paper digests
Each digest works through one paper with PACES: its purpose, approach, claims, evaluation, and what it adds to the taxonomy.
- 2026I·2 · Tool Manipulation
Malicious Agent Skills in the Wild: A Large-Scale Security Empirical Study
Liu, Chen, Zhang, Deng, Li, Ning, et al. · USENIX Security 2026
The first labelled study of malicious agent skills finds 157 confirmed among 98,380 community skills, most of their attacks written in plain language rather than code, and one actor behind more than half of them.
- 2026I·3 · Prompt Injection
ACIArena: Toward Unified Evaluation for Agent Cascading Injection
An, Li, Zhang, Xu, Zhou, Li, et al. · ACL 2026
ACIArena benchmarks how one injected input, agent or message cascades through a multi-agent system, across six real frameworks, and finds that topology alone says little about how robust a system is.
- 2025M·1 · Safety Alignment
Attack via Overfitting: 10-shot Benign Fine-tuning to Jailbreak LLMs
Xie, Song, Luo · NeurIPS 2025
An attacker can jailbreak a model through a fine-tuning API using only ten benign question–answer pairs, by first overfitting it to refuse everything and then teaching it to answer normally.
- 2025I·2 · RAG & Memory Poisoning
PoisonedRAG: Knowledge Corruption Attacks to Retrieval-Augmented Generation of Large Language Models
Zou, Geng, Wang, Jia · USENIX Security 2025
PoisonedRAG shows that an attacker who can add a few texts to a retrieval database can make a RAG system give an answer of their choosing, without touching the model or the retriever.
- 2025I·3 · Prompt Injection
Red-Teaming LLM Multi-Agent Systems via Communication Attacks
He, Lin, Dong, Xu, Xing, Liu · ACL 2025 Findings
Agent-in-the-Middle attacks a multi-agent system without touching any agent, only the messages one agent receives, and succeeds in over 40% of cases in every setting tested.
- 2025M·1 · Safety Alignment
Booster: Tackling Harmful Fine-tuning for Large Language Models via Attenuating Harmful Perturbation
Huang, Hu, Ilhan, Tekin, Liu · ICLR 2025
Booster defends against harmful fine-tuning before it happens, by training the aligned model so that a step towards harmful behaviour barely moves it.
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